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AN EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS: THE PRO SE
LITIGANT'S RIGHT TO NOTIFICATION OF THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RULE
INTRODUCTION
Although numerous cases have extolled the benefits of effective assist-
ance of counsel,' the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to ap-
pear pro se is one of long standing in the American judicial system.2
Whether this constitutional right extends to the civil litigant is less clear.'
A federal statutory provision, however, ensures the right to self-represen-
tation in civil matters.4
1. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (right to counsel attaches
when criminal defendant receives actual prison sentence); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45 (1963) (felony prosecutions trigger right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (establishing right to counsel in prosecutions for capital offienscs). But
see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (no right to counsel when prison sentence is
authorized but not imposed).
2. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) provides that "the
parties may plead and manage their own causes personally." The sixth amendment has
been construed to incorporate this provision. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271,
273-74 (2d Cir. 1964). For an extensive discussion of the historical origins of the right of
self-representation, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814-32 (1975). Neither the
federal government nor a state may impose a lawyer upon a criminal defendant. See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (1975); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
3. See Adams, 317 U.S. at 279 (answering affirmatively); Garrison v. Lacey, 362
F.2d 798, 799 (10th Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 911 (1967). But see An-
drews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 137 (1st Cir. 1985) (answering negatively),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2896 (1986); O'Reilly v. New York Times, 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2d
Cir. 1982) (same). Legitimate arguments have been advanced for both sides. Compare
Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice
Rules, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1515, 1531-32 (1984) (constitutional right to appear pro se in
civil cases), with Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and the Power of Jury Nulli-
fication, 28 Case W. Res. 269, 271 n.7 (1978) (no constitutional right to appear pro se in
civil cases). The Faretta court reasoned that criminal defendants have the right to appear
pro se because the criminal defendant personally bears the consequences of defeat and
that to thrust a lawyer on a criminal defendant is likely to convince him that the justice
system is against him. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). Although this
reasoning arguably applies to civil litigants, the "non-constitutional right" side appears to
have the stronger argument. Faretta based the constitutional right in the sixth amend-
ment, which only applies to criminal defendants. See id. at 832; see also U.S. Const.
amend. VI.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982) provides that "[i]n all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally." Although the excercise of
this statutory right has caused significant distress to the federal courts, see Green v.
McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (frivolous pro se litigation wastes
judicial resources and impairs chance of success of meritorious claims); Urban v. United
Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); In re Martin-Trigona, 737
F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 807 (1986) (pro se litigant abusing
legal system to harass defendants); Johnson v. Baskerville, 568 F. Supp 853, 855 (E.D.
Va. 1983) (frivolous pro se litigation burdens court system), the right is enforced strictly.
See Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning, Comm'n, 805 F.2d 272, 276 (7th
Cir. 1986) (failure to obtain counsel may not be held against pro se litigant); Traguth v.
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Pro se litigants, as well as those represented by counsel, are entitled to
meaningful access to the courts.' Sufficient access to the courts, a right
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment6 and
the first amendment,7 guarantees to all persons use of the judicial process
to redress alleged grievances.8 At the same time, the complex require-
ments of the summary judgment rule9 may frustrate the pro se litigant's
access to the trial court.° When presented with a motion for summary
judgment,1' many pro se litigants are unaware of their obligation to sub-
mit a reply affidavit.' 2 Consequently, summary judgment is entered fre-
Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1983) (requirement that pro se litigant answer complaint
through counsel held to violate statutory right); O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692
F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1982) (right to appear pro se valuable right not to be dishonored
by courts). Consequently, pro se claims-largely prisoner civil rights suits-comprise a
large percentage of the federal courts' caseload. See Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible
Litigant: An Inside View of the Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
157, 159-60 (1972).
5. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612-15 (1974) ; Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979). Although
access to the courts includes at least the opportunity to file a complaint, see Woff, 418
U.S. at 576; Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1981); Hatfield v.
Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961), it is not un-
restricted. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 578-79. For a discussion of
what the right has been construed to require, see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying
text.
6. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579-80; Corpus v. Estelle, 409 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.
Tex. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976); Potuto, The Right of Prisoner Access:
Does Bounds Have Bounds?, 53 Ind. L.J. 207, 215-19 (1977-78); Note, Prisoners'Rights-
Failure to Provide Adequate Law Libraries Denies Inmates' Right of Access to the Courts,
26 U. Kan. L. Rev. 636, 643-44 (1978).
7. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (right to petition Government for
redress of grievances); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963)(same).
8. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
10. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986); Lewis v. Faulkner,
689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 876-77 (7th Cir.
1981).
11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
12. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing) (laymen unable to appreciate procedural obligations); Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d
1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) ("it is not realistic to impute to [a pro se litigant] withoutlegal
background the awareness [of the consequences] of failing to respond.., to a motion for
summary judgment"); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (district court
erred in allowing forfeiture of pro se litigant's claim caused by litigant's lack of legal
skills); Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 898 (7th Cir.) (Swygert, J.) (advocating duty on
trial court to enlighten pro se litigants of procedural requirements when litigant is in state
"of natural confusion"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F.
Supp. 1330, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (low level of most pro se litigants' education precludes
assumption they can discern procedural obligations), rev'd on other grounds, 775 F.2d
1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986). The Prisoner Civil Rights
Committee adds that "it must also be realized that prisoners proceeding pro se cannot be
expected to know, understand, and follow the rules as required of attorneys. Therefore, it
is important for the magistrate or judge to acquaint the prisoner with the relevant rules
.... " Prisoner Civil Rights Committee, Federal Judicial Center, Recommended Proce-
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quently against pro se litigants before they are able to present their claim
adequately in the trial court.13
In holding that a criminal defendant who knowingly and intelligently
waives his right to assistance of counsel may appear pro se, the Supreme
Court has warned prospective pro se litigants that they will be accorded
neither special treatment nor leniency. " Despite the Supreme Court's
admonition in the criminal context, courts have tolerated informalities
from civil pro se litigants.' 5 Several courts of appeals recognize that a pro
se litigant is entitled to notice of the consequences of failure to submit
proper materials in response to a motion for summary judgment. 16
Other courts expressly reject the contention that pro se status confers
incidental rights upon a litigant and hold that pro se litigants must com-
dures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in the Federal Courts 64 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter by year, e.g., 1980 Aldisert Report]; accord Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 181-
82. But see Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting exceptional
quality of pro se litigant's response to motion for summary judgment); Dilibeck v. Duck-
worth, 585 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (complimenting pro se litigant's
traverse).
13. See e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986); Hudson v.
Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1093 & n.l (D.C. Cir. 1968).
14. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182-83 (1984); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975); Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984); Dozier v.
Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lecates v. Justice of the Peace
Court, 637 F.2d 898, 908 (3rd Cir. 1980); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311
(10th Cir. 1977); Mazique v. Mazique, 356 F.2d 801, 805 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 981 (1966); Larkin v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 338 F.2d 335, 336 (Ist Cir. 1964)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965); Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244
F.2d 511, 512 n.1 (10th Cir. 1957); Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 253-55 (9th
Cir. 1956). The Faretta admonition was premised on the presence of a criminal defend-
ant who had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to assistance of counsel. See
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 (1975). It is this element of waiver that justi-
fies the Court's refusal to assist the pro se litigant. Because there is no right to counsel in
civil cases, see Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886 (7th Cir. 1981); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1982) (court may request attorney to assist indigent litigant), this element of
waiver is absent in civil cases. Courts declining to inform pro se litigants of procedural
requirements because of their "choice" to appear pro se, see, e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1364 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1986); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981), thus demonstrate a
misplaced reliance on criminal pro se precedent.
15. See Cel-A-Pak v. California Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 680 F.2d 664, 667 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501 F.2d 880, 883
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
16. See e.g., Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983); Lewis v.
Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1982); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630-31
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam); cf Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to
meet personal service requirement does not mandate dismissal of pro se complaint);
Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439-40 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring explicit notice to pro se
prisoner of court's intent to treat motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment);
Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d 886, 887 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (local court rule requiring timely
response to motion to dismiss may not be used to dismiss pro se complaint where pro se
litigant is not apprised of rule); Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711, 714
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (limited opportunity of pro se prisoner to obtain documen-
tary evidence precludes strict application of Rule 56).
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ply with all applicable rules without any assistance from the judiciary.I7
One court provides notification of the requirements of the summary judg-
ment rule only to prisoner pro se litigants.I8 In light of the confusion in
the courts, a need exists for a uniform rule to promote consistent proce-
dural fairness to pro se litigants.' 9
Part I of this Note discusses the summary judgment rule2" and the
difficulties it presents to all pro se litigants. Part II argues that judicial
notification of the requirements of the summary judgment rule is a neces-
sary element of the right of access to the courts, is a logical extension of
courts' liberal treatment of pro se pleadings, is consistent with the judge's
role in the adversary system, and furthers the public's interest in a full
hearing on public law issues. Part III argues that the equal protection
clause mandates that this procedural protection be extended to all pro se
litigants and that courts that limit the protection to prisoner pro se liti-
gants misapprehend the circumstances of most instances of self-
representation.
I. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULE AND PRO SE LITIGANTS
A motion for summary judgment is granted in the federal courts only
when the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted convince the
court that no genuine issue of material fact exists entitling the movant to
17. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); Birl v. Es-
telle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311
(10th Cir. 1977); Larkin v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 338 F.2d 335, 336 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965).
18. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).
19. This Note addresses the treatment of pro se litigants in the federal courts. A
similar problem exists in the state courts. Compare Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 473
N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass. 1985) (pro se litigants held to less stringent standards than attor-
neys); Tyler v. Harper, 670 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. App. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
983 (1985); Blair v. Maynard, 324 S.E.2d 391, 396 (W. Va. 1984) (same) with In re Mar-
riage of Snyder, 701 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. App. 1985) (pro se litigants held to same stan-
dards as attorneys); Ronay v. Ronay, 369 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. App. 1985) (same).
20. Disposition of a case by summary judgment represents a final adjudication on the
merits. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 9.1, at 434-35 (1985).
It thus is crucial that pro se litigants be apprised of their obligations under the rule to
facilitate "an opportunity to present every factual and legal argument available." Finn v.
Gunter, 722 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1984). Providing notice of the requirements of the
summary judgment rule, however, will not afford adequate access to the courts in every
case, see Curry v. Brown, 440 F.2d 259, 262 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hudson v. Hardy, 412
F.2d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), but it should be a constitutional minimum. But see
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir.) (opportunity to serve and file com-
plaint satisfies right of access), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961). For an excellent discus-
sion of two circuits' treatment of pro se litigants who fail to file timely notices of appeal
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, see Note, Pro Se Appeals in the Fifth Cir-
cuit: The Gradual Demise of the Notice Exception to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a) and an Argument for Its Resurrection, 4 Rev. of Litigation 71 (1983) [hereinafter
Fifth Circuit] and Note, Filing Period Extensions for Pro Se Litigants in Civil Appeals, 42
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 470 (1985).
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judgment as a matter of law.21 The party moving for summary judgment
has the burden of establishing the absence of an issue of material fact,'
and must give adequate notice of the motion to the opponent.3
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)2 4 is a request to the court to review the suffi-
ciency of a claim solely on the pleadings.2" Because a complaint usually
can be amended, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not
interchangeable with a motion for summary judgment.2 6 A relation be-
tween the two rules, however, arises from the language of Rule 12(b).
When a motion to dismiss is supported by matters outside the pleadings,
the motion is transformed into a motion for summary judgment, 7 with
the attendant notice requirements of a summary judgment motion. 8
21. See Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981); Cubbage v. Averett,
626 F.2d 1307, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc.,
614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Halekulani Hotel Inc., 557 F.2d 1308, 1310
(9th Cir. 1977); Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Del.
1985); Fed. R Civ. P. 56 (c).
22. See Cedillo v. International Assoc. of Bridge & Structural Iron Workers, 603 F.2d
7, 10 (7th Cir. 1979); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 668 (4th ed. 1983).
23. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 20, § 9.2, at 436.
24. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
25. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356, at 592
(1969).
26. A complaint sought to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) usually may be amended,
see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Griggs v. Hinds Junior College, 563 F.2d
179, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1977); Fed R. Civ. P. 15(d); 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's
Federal Practice 12.07[2.-5], at 12-72 (2d ed. 1985), so that a complaint will not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is certain that the "plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); , accord
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A grant of summary judgment, however, is a
final adjudication on the merits. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 20,
§ 9.1, at 434-35.
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
28. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim ... matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also C. Wright, supra note 22, § 66, at 433. "Reasonable oppor-
tunity provided" has been construed to require the court to inform all parties of the
transformation. See Sims v. Mercy Hospital of Monroe, 451 F.2d 171, 173 (6th Cir.
1971) (per curiam); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1971).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates a hearing on a summary judgment
motion and at least ten days notice of that hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A majority
of the courts strictly enforce the notice provision, even when the motion for summary
judgment derives from a motion to dismiss supplemented by materials outside the plead-
ings. See, eg., Herron v. Beck, 693 F.2d 125, 126-27 (11th Cir. 1982); Hickey v. Arkla
Indus. Inc., 615 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d
761, 764 (8th Cir. 1978); Plante v. Shivar, 540 F.2d 1233, 1235 (4th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 483 F.2d 1351, 1352-53 (10th Cir.
1973); see also Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.)
(notice adequate for summary judgment requires that litigant be fairly apprised of review
beyond pleadings); cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1985). Several circuits, however, have
11131987]
1114 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that when a motion for
summary judgment is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary materi-
als, the opponent "must" respond with affidavits in opposition or eviden-
tiary materials of his own.29 The opponent may not rely on his pleading
to oppose the motion.3" This rule applies with equal force to pro se liti-
gants.31 Strict application of Rule 56 without the court's advising of the
Rule's requirements, however, usually imposes an insuperable hardship
on the pro se litigant.32 When failure to inform the pro se litigant results
in entry of judgment against him, several appellate courts require
reversal.33
A rule mandating that judges inform pro se litigants of their obliga-
tions under Rule 56(e) is necessitated by a layman's inability to discern
his obligations from reading the rule.34 Some courts requiring federal
judges to advise pro se litigants of their obligations under Rule 56(e) de-
rive the mandate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 This prac-
tice, however, has been rejected entirely by other courts.36 Therefore,
restricted strict compliance with the ten day notice rule in favor of a harmless error
approach. See, e.g., Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1970); Oppenheimer
v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324 F.2d 766, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). The hearing
contemplated in Rule 56(c) does not have to be an oral hearing, see Griffith v. Wain-
wright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (lth Cir.1985); Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 519 (11th
Cir. 1983), as most pro se litigants mistakenly believe. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d
1362, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The court need only take the
motion under advisement and the movant need only inform the opponent of the same.
See Griffith, 772 F.2d at 825; Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. In order to overrule a line of Third Circuit cases that permitted allegations in the
pleadings always to be adduced to establish an issue of material fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e) Advisory Committee's Notes, 1963 Amendment, the Rule was amended in 1963 to
require that the nonmoving party establish by affidavits a triable issue of fact when the
motion is supported by supplementary materials. See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); C. Wright, supra note 22, § 99,
at 667.
30. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366, n.11 (9th Cir. 1986); Hudson v.
Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 2552 (1986) (nonmoving party must respond only when movant offers proof of
absence of material fact).
31. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975); United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985).
32. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985); Curry v. Brown, 440
F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. See, e.g., Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1985); Moore v.
Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630-31
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam).
34. See Ross, 777 F.2d at 1219; Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982);
Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 202. But see Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1366-
67 (9th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigant expected to recognize summary judgment obligations
without assistance from court).
35. See, e.g., Ross, 777 F.2d at 1219 ("a gloss on the federal rules"); Lewis, 689 F.2d
at 101 ("fair inference from the rules").
36. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1365-67; Dozier v. Ford Motor Co, 702 F.2d 1189,
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there is a need to create a legal framework for the imposition of such a
duty on federal judges. Such a framework can be premised on the consti-
tutional right of access to the courts and the liberality traditionally ac-
corded pro se pleadings.
II. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND
JUDICIAL NOTIFICATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OBLIGATIONS
Although advising pro se litigants of procedural obligations facilitates
a fair hearing on the litigant's grievances, courts requiring judicial notifi-
cation of the requirements of the summary judgment rule have not es-
poused any single rationale. Some courts adopt unwritten approaches
and encourage flexibility to effectuate this pre-trial procedural safeguard-
ing of pro se claims.37 Other courts, without any detailed analysis, note
that dismissal of pro se complaints absent a meaningful opportunity to be
heard is inconsistent with due process."8 Although ultimately the ade-
quacy of a pro se litigant's access to the courts can be determined only on
a case by case basis,39 judicial advising of procedural requirements to pro
se litigants provides an unburdensome method of alleviating forfeitures
of claims before an adequate hearing."
1194 (D.C. Cir 1983); Bin v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977).
37. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Implicit in the right to self-
representation is an obligation... to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se liti-
gants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights .... "); Comment, State Prisoners
Federal Courts; and Playing by the Rules: An Analysis of the Aldisert Committee's Recom-
mended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, 5 U. of Puget Sound L.
Rev. 131, 134 (courts frequently utilize local rules and unwritten practices to ensure
meaningful consideration of pro se claims).
38. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11 th Cir. 1981); Madyun v.
Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1981); Mitchum v. Purvis, 650 F.2d 647, 648
(5th Cir. 1981). Two courts specifically raised a due process issue only to avoid the
"thorny question" of inconsistency of failing to notify with due process. See Lewis v.
Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1982); Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120,
124 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985)
(suggesting pro se litigant is deprived of opportunity to be heard when trial court declines
to advise him of summary judgment obligations). One commentator has submitted that
no judicial effort is too great if it tends toward just resolution of all pro se claims. See
Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the Game,
41 Bklyn. L. Rev. 769, 772 (1975). Another commentator noted that judges are permit-
ted to react impromptu to promote adequate access to the courts at the pre-trial stage.
See Turk, Access to the Federal Courts by State Prisoners in Civil Rights Actions, 64 Va. L
Rev. 1349, 1353 (1978).
39. See Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1214 (1983).
40. See Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985).
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A. Right Of Access
Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right.4
1
Derived from the first amendment 42 and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 43 the right protects a litigant's interest in using
the judicial process to attain redress of grievances. 44 For pro se litigants,
the right guarantees all the means necessary to ensure an adequate hear-
ing on all alleged grievances.45
The early cases construing the right of access involved impermissible
obstruction of access to the courts.46 A series of later cases, however,
culminating in Bounds v. Smith,47 imposed an affirmative obligation on
41. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969).
42. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); Harrison v. Springdale
Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1427-28 (8th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Thompson,
593 F.2d 1375, 1387 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d
967, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983).
44. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579; Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
45. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd
sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
46. The importance of the right of access has long been recognized by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). In the
prisoner context, however, this recognition emerged much more gradually. Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546, (1941) generally is considered the first case to recognize a right of
access to the courts for prisoners. See Potuto, supra note 6, at 207; Note, A Federal
Litigation Program: For Students, Inmates and the Legal Profession, 4 Nova L.J. 377, 386
(1980); Comment, An Overview of Prisoners' Rights: Part I,Access to the Courts Under
Section 1983, 14 St. Mary's L.J. 957, 961 (1983). Before Hull, courts generally believed
that it was not within their province to ensure that prison administrative policies did not
obstruct the prisoner's path to the courthouse. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d
771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam) ("Courts are without power to supervise prison
administration .... No authorities are needed to support [this] statement"); Wright v.
United States, 172 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1949) ("[tjhe court has no power to interfere
with the conduct of the prison or its discipline"); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 798 (1871) ("[the prisoner] is for the time being a slave, in a condition of
penal servitude to the State, and is subject to such laws and regulations as the State may
choose to prescribe"). But see Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (per
curiam) ("A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly,
or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."). See generally Note, Constitutional
Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 985, 986 (1962) (discussing
the attempts courts have made to reach middle ground between these two positions).
This laissezfaire approach to state regulation was put to rest by the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). The Hull Court ruled that a state may not require that a
legal investigator from a parole board review a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus
before filing. See id. at 549. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), was the next
landmark right of access case. Recognizing that prisoners' right of access to the courts is
fundamental, see id. at 485, the Court held that unless a state provides a reasonable alter-
native, it may not prevent inmates from procuring assistance of prison writ-writers to
pursue habeas corpus relief. See id. at 490. Both Hull and Johnson stand for the proposi-
tion that a state may not impede a pro se prisoner's access to the courts to pursue habeas
corpus relief. See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485; Hull, 312 U.S. at 549; see also Potuto, supra
note 6, at 209.
47. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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the state to assist pro se litigants in certain circumstances.4" In Bounds,
the Supreme Court held that the right of access requires states to assist
prisoners in filing legal papers in all cases." The Court decided that this
could be effectuated only by providing prisoners with either an adequate
law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.'
48. In Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd sub
nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam), the scope of the right of
access was broadened significantly. The Gilmore court ruled that a state has an affirma-
tive obligation to provide prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief with either a law library
or legal services to satisfy the right of access. See id. at 110-12. Although this holding is
notable for shifting the states' burden from a negative one to an affirmative one, see
Potuto, supra note 6, at 210, neither the district court nor the Supreme Court suggested
the constitutional basis for this obligation. See Younger, 404 U.S. at 15; Gilmore, 319 F.
Supp. at 109. The district court considered this new obligation to be constitutionally
mandated, but did not furnish the constitutional source. See Gilmore, at 112.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court extended the right of access
beyond habeas corpus cases to actions brought under § 1983, see id. at 579-80, and as-
serted that the constitutional basis of the right is the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See id at 579. "[N]o person will be denied the opportunity to present to the
judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights." Id.
The Court concluded that safeguarding the ability to file a complaint satisfied the right.
See id at 576.
49. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977).
50. See id. at 828. Unlike the Wolff Court, the Bounds Court did not specify the
constitutional basis of the right of access. The Bounds Court simply stated that its deci-
sions over the last 35 years recognized the right and then traced the right's development
over those years. See id at 821-23. Chief Justice Burger noted the majority's omission of
a constitutional source. See id at 833 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist chal-
lenged the right's constitutional derivation. See id at 837-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Most circuit court cases construing Bounds have focused on the adequacy of the law
libraries provided to prisoners who appear pro se. See, e.g., Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424,
429 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978).
Reasonable prison regulations limiting the time, see, eg., Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352,
358 (10th Cir. 1978) (two hours a week of library time satisfies the right); Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir. 1977) (one hour a week insufficient), place, see,
e.g., Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1370-72 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (dangerous prisoner's
right of access satisfied by permission to check out two books every other night rather
than research in library), and manner, see, eg., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th
Cir. 1986) (denial of access to prison's main law library does not offend right of access), in
which prisoners may conduct legal research comport with the right. See generally
Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1984) (delineating minimum requirements for
adequate law library); Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 82-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (example of a
prison law library found to satisfy Bounds).
If the state chooses to satisfy its Bounds obligations by providing legal assistance from
persons trained in the law, it need only offer counsel to a prisoner. See United States v.
Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983); Williams
v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979). But see
Wilson, 690 F.2d at 1278 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (counsel appointed to represent pro se
litigant inconsistent with self-representation "and hence cannot afford a pro se litigant
meaningful access."). If the offer for legal assistance is declined, there is no right to a law
library. See Wilson, 690 F.2d at 1271; Spates, 644 F.2d at 84-85; United States v. Chat-
man, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978). It is undisputed that provision of counsel with
whom there is adequate contact satisfies the Bounds standard of individuals trained in the
law. See, e.g., United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir. 1977) (opportunity to
interview winesses by telephone and availability of attorney to obtain legal materials satis-
fies right of access); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1971) (services of two
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Although Bounds is the latest and broadest expansion of the right of
access, it does not represent the outer limits of the right. For all liti-
gants-pro se prisoners, pro se non-prisoners, and those litigants repre-
sented by counsel-the scope of the right of access is indeterminate. 5'
The Bounds Court stressed that the central issue in establishing what the
right of access requires is to determine what is necessary to make access
to the courts "adequate, effective, and meaningful."52 Thus, although
Bounds only applies to prisoner pro se litigants, it indicates that ensuring
a fair hearing sometimes requires affirmative state action. 3 The Bounds
Court concluded that the difficulties attendant to pro se representation
warrant affirmative state assistance.5 4
Pro se litigants labor under the disadvantage of being unable to read
procedural rules effectively. 5 Most pro se litigants think that a lawsuit
proceeds neatly from complaint to answer to trial.56 Thus when served
with a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits or other
supplementary materials, pro se plaintiffs assume that they can contest
the defendant's assertions at oral argument.57 Several courts recognize
that service of a motion for summary judgment does not adequately ad-
vise a pro se litigant of the duty to submit affidavits or other evidentiary
materials in opposition to the motion because the requirement is not ex-
plicitly stated in Rule 56(e).- 8 Although courts assume that attorneys are
attorneys inadequate for prison with 12,000 inmates), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
There is some dispute among the circuits, however, whether assistance from nonattorneys
satisfies the right. Compare United States v. Blue Thunder, 604 F.2d 550, 556-57 (8th
Cir.) (assistance from law students satisfies the right), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 902 (1979);
French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910, 924 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (inmate clerks sufficient) and
Graham v. Hutto, 437 F. Supp. 118, 119 (E.D. Va. 1977) (same), aff'd, 571 F.2d 575 (4th
Cir. 1978) with Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 216 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (only attor-
ney assistance satisfies the right) and Gibson v. Jackson, 443 F. Supp. 239, 250 (M.D. Ga.
1977) (same), vacated and remanded, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1119 (1979).
51. See Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging that
extent to which courts should be required to assist pro se litigants is unclear), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1214 (1983); Potuto, supra note 6, at 216; Turk, supra note 38, at 1351; 1977
Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 3 (need for a proper definition of the role of the federal
judiciary in prisoner pro se cases).
52. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); accord Hoppins v. Wallace, 751
F.2d 1161, 1162 (1Ith Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 359 (10th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam). Any plan to facilitate the right of access must be viewed as a
whole to determine if it passes constitutional muster. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832; see
also United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 716 (2d Cir. 1960) (any procedure adopted
by a court in handling pro se cases should be calculated to effectuate meaningful access);
Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983) (no constitutional requirement
that court pay pro se litigant's witness fees), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983).
53. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
54. See id. at 823-26.
55. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 64 (pro se litigants not expected to
understand rules).
56. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982).
57. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1368; Lewis, 689 F.2d at 102.
58. See Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Faulkner,
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able to discern the proper construction of the Rule, it is unreasonable to
presume that pro se litigants possess comparable skills of statutory or
rule construction. 9 Even the most intelligent, educated layman is un-
likely to be able to properly construe procedural rules.60 Most pro se
litigants are uneducated,6 augmenting the futility of expecting them to
recognize complex procedural requirements without at least notification
of those requirements.
The necessity of judicial notification to pro se litigants is more appar-
ent when the summary judgment motion is derived from a 12(b)(6) mo-
tion supported by matters outside the pleadings. The motion papers
often do not indicate that the motion indeed is one for summary judg-
ment.62 Thus, the pro se litigant is doubly handicapped by his inability
to discern his obligations under Rule 56 and by his misunderstanding of
the consequences of the conversion of a motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment.
For the prisoner pro se litigant, the fact of confinement further re-
stricts the pursuit of relief and in most cases pits the prisoner against a
formidable opponent-the state. 3 Confinement often fatally hampers a
prisoner's ability to gather evidence to support a case against his
keeper. 6" Confinement also makes compliance with procedural deadlines
689 F.2d 100, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1982); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630-31 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam). The majority in Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986), draws
the opposite conlusion, claiming that Rule 56 is explicit. The force of this argument,
however, is undercut by the presence of a local court rule that explicitly defined the
requirements to oppose a motion for summary judgment. See id. Thus, Jacobsen's ra-
tionale is inapposite in districts without such a local rule.
59. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1368 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The Civil Rights Com-
mittee adds that "it must also be realized that prisoners proceeding pro se cannot be
expected to know, understand, and follow the rules as required of attorneys. Therefore, it
is important for the magistrate or judge to acquaint the prisoner with the relevant rules
." 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 64.
60. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (district court erred in al-
lowing forfeiture of pro se litigant's claim caused by litigant's lack of legal skills); Parisie
v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 898 (7th Cir.) (Swygert, J., concurring) (advocating duty on trial
court to enlighten pro se litigants of procedural requirements when litigant is in state of
"natural confusion"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); Flannery & Robbins, supra note
38, at 778 (most pro se litigants are unable to properly construe procedural rules).
61. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986); Zeigler
& Hermann, supra note 4, at 181-82.
62. See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973) ("[w]hat for a private citizen
would be a dispute with his landlord.., becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the
State"). This scenario is common as 95% of pro se litigation involves prisoners seeking a
writ of habeas corpus or alleging civil rights violations. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra
note 4, at 159-60.
64. See Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam); cf Johnson v.
RAC Corp., 491 F.2d 510, 514 (4th Cir. 1974) (court's duty to inform nonmoving party
of right to file affidavits heightened where nonmoving party has superior access to facts).
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and obligations difficult because of the prisoner's limited ability to con-
tact the proper authorities concerning the progress of his lawsuit.65
B. Liberal Treatment of Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings generally are held to less stringent standards than
those applied to members of the Bar.6 6 Pro se complaints should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is apparent that they are
unsupportable in law or fact. 67 If the complaint misapprehends the claim
appropriate to its grievance, the trial court must recharacterize the
claim.68 Similarly, pro se complaints cannot be construed inflexibly so as
to require dismissal if the complaint fails to request precise appropriate
relief.69
Advising pro se litigants of summary judgment obligations is a logical
extension of the liberality accorded pro se litigants in the federal courts.7"
The diminished requirements of pro se filings are an effort to afford a
layman an opportunity to proceed in a legal system designed for individ-
uals trained in the law.71 This benefit, by its terms, seems to extend only
to the pleading stage.72 Such a limitation, however, thwarts the pro se
litigant's access to the courts.7 3 The murky, often conclusory allegations
65. See Note, Fifth Circuit, supra note 20, at 74.
66. For example, in reviewing a pro se litigant's complaint for dismissal, the court
must read the complaint less stringently than it would an attorney's. See Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972) (per curiam); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 876 (7th Cir. 1981). Pro se
prisoners are not prejudiced by the filing of handwritten materials. See Twyman v. Crisp,
584 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Tarlton v. Henderson, 467 F.2d 200, 201
(5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
67. See Brandon v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 734 F.2d 56, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir.
1983); Bayron v. Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1983).
68. See Madison v. Tahash, 359 F.2d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1966) (construing application
for appointment of counsel as one for a certificate of probable cause); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(application for order mandating parole board to state reasons for denying parole may be
treated as habeas corpus petition), aff'd, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded,
419 U.S. 1015 (1974). But see Mundy v. Winston, 457 F. Supp. 678, 680 (E.D. Va. 1978)
(pro se litigant always must have ultimate decision to elect what claim he will pursue).
69. See DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1966); Downing v. New Mex-
ico Supreme Court, 339 F.2d 435, 436 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Holsey v. Bass, 519
F. Supp. 395, 402-03 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). See generally
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam) (pro se pleadings held to less
stringent standards than those applied to attorneys).
70. This appears to be the view of several courts that require notification of summary
judgment obligations to pro se litigants. See Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520-21
(lth Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1982).
71. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
72. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21.
73. See Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985) (analogizing Haines
ruling to diminished summary judgment rigor for pro se litigants). Although a pro se
litigant should not obtain any advantages in a lawsuit from his self-representation, he
should not incur any disabilities from his lack of legal training that easily could be
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of a pro se complaint are inappropriate bases for disposition of a case on
the merits.74 Affidavits and other evidentiary materials usually are
needed to furnish sufficient facts to decide a pro se litigant's case. 7- With-
out guidance regarding summary judgment motion practice, the underly-
ing rationale for liberal treatment of pro se pleadings is thwarted. To
liberalize pleading requirements for pro se litigants to ensure entry into
the courthouse and then demand rigorous compliance with pretrial pro-
cedural rules fosters a tenuous access to the courts.76
In response to the difficulty pro se litigants have in recognizing sum-
mary judgment obligations, some courts have expanded the liberality tra-
ditionally demonstrated toward pro se pleadings7" into a general attitude
of judicial paternalism toward pro se litigants.7" Several courts, however,
averted by judicial solicitude for his claim. See Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120,
124 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (4th Cir.) ("[a] district
court is not required to act as an advocate for a pro se litigant; but... should afford him
a reasonable opportunity to determine the correct person... against whom the claim is
asserted, [and] advise him how to proceed .... ) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978).
74. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 1980 Al-
disert Report, supra note 12, at 12, 46. But see Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of
Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 617 n.46 (1979)
(noting that most pro se complaints Turner encountered were typed, legible, and concise).
75. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 202. This rationale seems to underlie the
Fourth Circuit cases requiring that judges apprise pro se litigants of summary judgment
obligations. In Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals established the broad rule that "a pro se plaintiff" must
be apprised of his obligations under the summary judgment rule before summary judg-
ment may be entered against him. See id. at 310. The court cites Hudson v. Hardy, 412
F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968), as a precursor of its decision, yet does not refer to that case's
reliance on the handicaps imposed on a litigant by detention in formulating a similar rule.
See Roseboro, 528 F.2d at 310. Instead, the Roseboro court justifies its procedural leni-
ency on the ground that a litigant is unrepresented. See id.; accord Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at
1368 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); see also Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir.
1985) (to protect pro se litigant from forfeiture of rights because of ignorance); Davis v.
Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979) (same).
77. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Ker-
ner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
78. Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curian), was the first case to accord less stringent procedural requirements on pro se
litigants. In Phillips, the district court entered summary judgment against an inmate
seeking release from detention when he failed to respond to a motion for summary judg-
ment supported by affidavits. See iL at 713. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
although the government had complied with Rule 56, application of that rule "with strict
literalness" was inappropriate. See id at 714. The difficulties in obtaining counsel and
gathering evidence resulting from incarceration convinced the court that the require-
ments of Rule 56 should not be applied rigidly to litigants so burdened. See id. at 713-14.
Precisely how they should be applied was not articulated by the same court until the
seminal case of Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
In Hudson, a prisoner alleging violations of constitutional rights appeared pro se when
his request for appointment of counsel was denied. See idL at 1093. In vacating an order
of summary judgment against the inmate, the court held that a prisoner who had not
been apprised of his obligation to submit counter-affidavits, in response to a motion for
summary judgment supported by affidavits had not been afforded an opportunity to com-
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ply with Rule 56(e). See id. at 1094. This rationale has been echoed by most courts
requiring judges to inform pro se litigants of obligations under Rule 56. See Maggette v.
Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983); Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (11 th
Cir. 1983); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 1981); Ham v. Smith, 653
F.2d 628, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The notice provided by the court must be sufficiently clear
to impress the consequences of failure to submit counter-affidavits or other responsive
materials. See Hudson, 412 F.2d at 1094; accord Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102
(7th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979); Roseboro, 528
F.2d at 310.
Most of the cases following Hudson seemed to base their decisions on an attempt to
redress the significant disparity in legal abilities existing between represented and unrep-
resented litigants. See, e.g., Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984) (because
pro se litigants are unable to comprehend procedural requirements, court must ensure
this ignorance does not cause loss of claim); Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (inmates' limited access to legal materials increases inequality with represented
litigants); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (recently re-
leased prisoner likely to labor under same handicaps as inmate in complying with sum-
mary judgment rule); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979) (pro se
plaintiffs require safeguarding from summary disposition claims); Roseboro v. Garrison,
528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (same). An emerging body of caselaw
from the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, however, suggests that this extension of the right
of access is a legitimate inference from the reduced pleading requirements for pro se
litigants espoused in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972),. In Craig v. Garri-
son, 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167
(4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit cited Haines for the broad proposition "that a pro se
petitioner untrained in the law is not to be held to the same standards as a member of the
bar." See id. at 307; cf Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447-48 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984)
(noting leniency towards pro se litigants in jurisdictional matters); Canty v. City of Rich-
mond, 383 F. Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (E.D. Va. 1974) (stating heightened solicitude re-
quired for pro se plaintiffs to ensure allegations of constitutional deprivations are not
defeated because of inartful presentation), aff'd sub nom. Canty v. Brown, 526 F.2d 587
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976). This is unmistakably an extension of
the Court's ruling in Haines. The Craig court, however, makes no reference to its broad-
ening of Haines.
In Muhammad v. Rowe, 638 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit reversed an
order of summary judgment against a pro se civil rights litigant who had not been in-
formed of his obligation to file affidavits to oppose the motion. See id. at 695-96. The
court united two sentences from Haines to conclude that a pro se "plaintiff 'is entitled to
an opportunity to offer proof' unless 'it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." '" See id.
at 695 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 1972, quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
One year later, in Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982), the court promul-
gated a general rule that prisoner pro se litigants are entitled to be informed of their
obligations under Rule 56(e), whether the motion is labelled as such or is derived from a
motion to dismiss. See id. at 102. Although the Lewis court did not cite Haines, it spoke
in terms of an "opportunity" to offer proof in response to a motion for summary judg-
ment. See id. (emphasis in original). The court posited that given a layman's inadequate
legal acumen, mere time to respond does not constitute an opportunity to oppose the
motion. See id. Only notice of the motion's requirements can afford the layman an op-
portunity to respond. See id. In so holding, the Lewis court imported the Rule 12(b)
notion of "reasonable opportunity" into what constitutes sufficient notice of the require-
ments of Rule 56. See id. at 101-02. The court reasoned that the mandate of notice
required by Rule 12(b) when a motion to dismiss is converted into one for summary
judgment commands trial courts to inform pro se litigants of summary judgment obliga-
tions. See id. at 101. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in pertinent part: "all parties shall
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refuse to adopt such a flexible approach,79 finding it incongruous with the
judge's role in the adversary process."' An analysis of the adversary sys-
tem and the judge's role therein, however, reveals that this concern is
unjustified.
C. The Adversary System
American courts operate under the adversary system of dispute resolu-
tion." Under this system, justice is presumed to be attained through an
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56." The notice provision raises an inference that before summary judgment can
be entered against a pro se prisoner, explicit notice of the requirements of responding to
such a motion must be given. See Lewis, 689 F.2d at 101-02.
In Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit reafflirmed its
reliance on Haines in fashioning this "prophylactic rule" for pro se prisoners. See id. at
1219; cf Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning Comm'n, 805 F.2d 272, 277 n.9
(7th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigants entitled to "fair and meaningful consideration on the
merits"). The Ross court strengthened the notice requirement's bond to Haines' rule of
liberal construction of pro se filings by invoking its reasoning to address the inappropri-
ateness of requiring procedural stringency of pro se litigants. See Ross, 777 F.2d at 1219.
Like the Fourth Circuit in Craig, the Seventh Circuit made no attempt in Ross or
Muhammad to justify its significant extension of the Haines ruling.
79. A number of courts expressly hold that pro se status confers no incidental rights
on a litigant and that he must comply with all applicable rules without any assistance
from the judiciary. See, e.g., Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Bin v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fowler, 605
F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); United States v. Pinkey,
548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir. 1977); Mazique v. Mazique, 356 F.2d 801, 805 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U. S. 981 (1966); Larkin v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 338 F.2d 335,
336 (1st Cir), cerL denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965); Springer v. Best, 264 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir.
1959); see also Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986) (judge may
not become an advocate for pro se litigant); Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 253-55
(9th Cir. 1956) (pro se litigant's misapprehensions of pleadings, pre-trial conferences,
jurisdiction, and legal ethics not to be dispelled by court). The Supreme Court has issued
the broad admonition that pro se litigants must comply with all procedural rules without
any assistance from the judiciary. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-84
(1984); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975). At least one commentator
has suggested that judicial assistance of pro se litigants in the procedural area does not
comport with the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Comment, supra
note 37, at 158.
80. See e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986). The curious
aspect of the Jacobsen court's rationale is that the court undercuts its own essential prem-
ise. The essence of the court's objection to judicial advisement of summary judgment
obligations to pro se litigants is the incompatibiltiy of the practice with the judge's role as
impartial arbiter in the adversary system. See id.; see also Committee on the Federal
Courts, Recommendations for the Improvement of the Administration of Pro Se Civil
Rights Litigation in the Federal District Courts in the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York, 30 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 107, 110 (1975) [hereinafter Committee] (arguing
that nature of judge's role in adversary system precludes judicial assistance of pro se
litigants); Robbins & Herman, Pro Se Litigation: Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta Or
For Worse, 42 Bklyn L. Rev. 629, 681 (1976) (same). Analytically, this objection must
apply with equal force regardless of the pro se litigant's freedom or economic status. Yet,
the court unceremoniously concedes that the practice is permissible when the pro se liti-
gant is a prisoner. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1364. Nevertheless, Jacobsen rasises the
broader issue of whether judges should assist any pro se litigants.
81. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972). See generally Miller, The
1987] 1123
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
equal contest of contrary interests.8 2 The system essentially allows liti-
gants to argue their dispute before a neutral observer whose duty is to
decide the outcome.83 The traditional roles in the adversary system are
familiar to all. The lawyers are expected to frame the issues and propel
the contest while the judge passively receives the information presented
to him for his evaluation.
In the area of judicial involvement in pro se litigation, as elsewhere,
there is a line between a "legitimate advisory role" and "the improper
role of an advocate."85 Nevertheless, judicial paternalism for the pro se
litigant in procedural areas is justified and necessary for several reasons.
The effective operation of the adversary system relies on the assump-
tion that the parties to a lawsuit are approximately equal in their legal
representation. 6 This rough balance, however, is entirely upset when
one side appears pro se.8 7 The pro se prisoner and the nonprisoner pro se
litigant are at a serious disadvantage when seeking relief in the courts
against represented parties.88 These disadvantages underscore the neces-
sity of assisting the pro se litigant in pursuing his claim through notifica-
tion of summary judgment requirements as they arise.
Attorneys frequently subordinate truth and fairness to the quest for
victory.89 The ethical standards require zealous representation of the cli-
ent, 90 but no obligation to seek the truth.9 This duty of zealous represen-
tation has tainted the adversary system because attorneys employ
strategies to impede the search for truth at trial.92 For example, attor-
neys opposing pro se litigants often try to delay the case knowing of the
limited patience and resources of pro se litigants. 93 By failing to notify
the pro se litigant that a motion for summary judgment supported by
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 Minn L. Rev. 1 (1984) (discussing the viabil-
ity of adversary system in modem litigation); Model Code of Professional Responsibility
EC 7-19 to -39 (outlining duties attorneys have to adversary system).
82. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
83. See M. Frankel, Partisan Justice 68 (1980); Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33
U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 2 (1978).
84. See M. Frankel, supra note 83, at 43.
85. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1475 (1986); accord Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984);
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir.) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978).
86. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
986 (1983). But see id., at 771 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(permitting litigants to hire superior counsel negates any expectations of approximate
equality); Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. Miami
L. Rev. 21, 23-24 (1978) (same).
87. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977); Merritt, 697 F.2d at 764 n.3.
88. See infra notes 89-94, 148-49, & 182-85 and accompanying text.
89. See Frankel, The Searchfor Truth:An Umpireal View, 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1031,
1038-39 (1975).
90. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1978).
91. See Frankel, supra note 83, at 1038-39.
92. See M. Frankel, supra note 83, at 14-18, 26-34; Friendly, supra note 86, at 23-24.
93. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 181.
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affidavits must be responded to, attorneys expedite the swift dismissal of
many pro se suits.
The ascertainment of the truth is the fundamental purpose of any
trial.94 To further this goal, the trial judge has an obligation to inject
certain matters into the trial that he believes crucial to the determination
of the truth.95 Judges also are afforded wide latitude in their conduct of a
trial when their actions are geared towards ensuring a just result.96 Even
where a judge's alleged advocacy for one party constitutes error, it will
not be reversed unless the other party is prejudiced. 97 In the exercise of
this legitimate supervisory role, the courts allow judges to assume a far
more active role in shaping lawsuits and influencing results than mere
notification of procedural requirements.98
In the context of pro se litigation, some courts permit more substantial
intrusions into the adversary process. For example, courts assist pro se
94. See Tehan v. United States ex reL Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
95. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976) (judge must assert substan-
tial control over trial procedures and witness testimony); United States v. Pinkey, 548
F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1977) (court's suggestion to prosecution concerning what need
be elicited from expert witness not prejudicial); Ayash v. United States, 352 F.2d 1009,
1010 (10th Cir. 1965) (trial court may examine witnesses).
96. See Gardner v. United States, 283 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1960) (trial court may
disallow questions to witness even before objection is made by opponent).
97. See Pinkney, 548 F.2d at 310; Chase v. Crisp, 523 F.2d 595, 600 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
98. For example, a growing body of caselaw from the Third Circuit asserts that inher-
ent judicial powers allow a court to grant a defense witness immunity in certain circum-
stances. See eg., Government of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913(1979). The judiciary traditionally defers to prosecutorial discretion as to whom to im-
munize. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); United States v. Herman,
589 F.2d 1191, 1203 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). The federal immu-
nity statute does not confer on federal courts the power to grant immunity to trial wit-
nesses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1982); see also United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443,
449-50 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 824 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977). Thus the compatibility of this practice with the traditional
role of the judiciary in the adversary system is questionable. See Government of Virgin
Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1980). The position the Third Circuit ad-
vances significantly alters the judge's role in an adversary proceeding and disregards an
unequivocal congressional intent only to allow prosecutors to grant immunity. See 18
U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4007, 4018 ("The court's role in granting the [immunity]
order is merely to find the facts on which the order is predicated."). Federal judges are
authorized to call witnesses they believe crucial to a fair adjudication of a controversy.
See Fed. R. Evid. 614(a). They may also examine witnesses to clarify their testimony for
themselves and for the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 614(b); see also United States v.
Cheatwood, 575 F.2d 821, 826 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978). Finally, sua
sponte dismissal of pro se complaints prior to service of process, and without notice to the
pro se litigant, has been questioned as placing the judge in the role of defense counsel, yet
is permissible in the adversary system. See Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir.
1986); Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 662
F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Holloway v. Gunnell, 685
F.2d 150, 152 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant may want to reach the merits).
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litigants in their presentation to the jury by reviewing the litigants' pro-
posed questions to witnesses for admissibility problems so as to avoid
interruptions from objecting counsel during trial.99 Courts also articu-
late the appropriate legal theory on which a pro se litigant's claim should
rest when the litigant misunderstands the nature of his claim. 1" Both
practices are permissible judicial interventions on behalf of pro se
litigants. 10
The cases discussing allegations of judicial "advocacy" consistently ex-
press the concern that the judge's actions should not become a control-
ling influence on the jury.' 2 Unlike reviewing proposed questions or
articulating a legal theory, informing a pro se litigant of summary judg-
ment obligations does not increase the litigant's chance of prevailing on
the merits. 103 Rather, it merely ensures that the litigant will be heard on
the merits. The jury remains completely unaware of the judge's
actions. 1'
To ensure adequate access, the courts, in the first instance, may re-
quest that opposing counsel assume the responsibility of providing ade-
quate notice to pro se litigants. 105 If, however, opposing counsel fails to
comply with the court's request, the ultimate responsibility must rest
with the judiciary." 6 Imposition of an obligation to notify pro se liti-
99. For example, in Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 799 F.2d 486 (9th
Cir. 1986), the trial court, in a pretrial order, required a nonprisoner pro se litigant to
submit to the court and opposing counsel the questions he wished to ask witnesses at
trial. See id. at 487. The trial judge then deleted objectionable questions from the list to
enable the pro se litigant to present his case to the jury with a minimum of interruptions
from objecting counsel. See id. at 488. But cf United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12
(9th Cir. 1975) (pro se litigant has no right to have judge examine witnesses for him).
100. See Myers v. United States, 636 F.2d 166, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1981); Watson v. Ault,
525 F.2d 886, 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1976).
101. See supra notes 99-100.
102. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 472 (1933); Starr v. United States, 153
U.S. 614, 624-28 (1894); Ayash v. United States, 352 F.2d 1009, 1010 (10th Cir. 1965).
103. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985).
104. The practice of calling and examining witnesses, see supra note 98, approaches
judicial advocacy far more than apprising pro se litigants of their summary judgment
obligations. By assuming an active role at trial, the judge inevitably will be perceived by
the jury as sponsoring one cause. Informing pro se litigants of summary judgment obliga-
tions merely helps to ensure that the litigant is heard at trial. The crucial issue in review-
ing a judge's decision to question or call a witness is whether the judge maintained an
appearance of impartiality at trial. See United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967, 971 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978). When a judge informs a pro se litigant of a
procedural obligation, the issue of impartiality does not even arise. The informing judge
is not advocating the pro se litigant's claim before the jury. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790
F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The notification of the obliga-
tion is not mentioned at trial. The judge only is furthering the goal of eliciting the truth,
see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976), by bringing the pro se litigant up
to the approximate level of a represented litigant. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1369 (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting); see also Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (pro se litigants "should fare no worse" than those represented by errant lawyers).
105. See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. See id. at 103.
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gants of the requirements of opposing a motion for summary judgment
will not burden the federal judiciary's workload.1 °7
D. The Public's Interest in Providing an Adequate Hearing on
Significant Constitutional Issues
Requiring trial judges to advise pro se litigants of summary judgment
obligations advances the public's interest in according public law issues a
complete hearing."0 ' The Supreme Court consistently has emphasized
the significant role that habeas corpus petitions and civil rights claims
play in advancing fundamental constitutional rights." 9 Prisoner civil
rights claims in particular often present novel questions of constitutional
import and provide the judiciary with an opportunity to address these
questions.110
Pro se litigants have made notable contributions to the basic structure
of American law. A pro se petition filed by Clarence Gideon resulted in
the landmark holding of Gideon v. Wainwright.11 Pro se litigants have
initiated suits that resulted in landmark holdings in tax, 112 civil rights," 3
107. See Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985).
108. The salient feature of public law litigation is that it seeks more than the resolution
of a dispute between two private parties. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (1976). It involves issues of constitutional
and statutory significance. See id The relief in public law litigation is not only compensa-
tion for past harm, but a decree that will direct future behavior. See id. The Report of
the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972), con-
cluded that "it is of the greatest importance to society as well as to the individual that
each meritorious [prisoner] petition be identified and dealt with." Id. at 587.
109. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 502 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1953); see also Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d
476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (importance to society and the courts of encouraging citizens to
aid in prosecuting violators of the law). But see United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707,
715 (2d Cir. 1960) (large number of habeas corpus petitions are frivolous).
110. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); 1980 Aldisert Report, supra
note 12, at 11; Turk, supra note 38, at 1349.
111. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in all felony cases).
112. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1974) (non-
prisoner pro se raised the issue of first impression whether a tax exemption to a private
foundation may constitute state action). This case was termed "the most significant con-
test determined by the Second Circuit in the 1973-74 term." Flannery & Robbins, supra
note 38, at 774.
113. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1971) (pro se prisoner
challenged a one year imposition of solitary confinement and seizure of all his personal
belongings), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). Judge Kaufman characterized Sostre as
presenting "important questions concerning the federal constitutional rights of state pris-
oners which neither Supreme Court precedent nor our own past decisions have an-
swered." See id. at 181. See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (broad
censorship of prisoner's mail violates the first amendment); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 490 (1969) (right to assistance of jailhouse lawyers to pursue habeas corpus relief);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 572-75 (8th Cir. 1968) (requiring reforms at the Tucker
Prison Farm in Arkansas).
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and habeas corpus law. 1 4 Pro se litigants also have substantially affected
the conduct of prison management.11 5
Although the significance of the civil rights claims brought by pro se
litigants has prompted commentators to urge appointment of counsel in
every section 1983 case," 6 the courts have not embraced this sugges-
tion. '17 Nevertheless, the importance of these suits should preclude the
courts from relying solely on opposing counsel to provide adequate no-
tice to the pro se litigant of the requirements of the summary judgment
rule."18 It rests with the judiciary to ensure that pro se claims of consti-
tutional significance be afforded an adequate hearing.
III. PRISONER AND NONPRISONER PRO SE LITIGANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL NOTIFICATION OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OBLIGATIONS
Because the vast majority of pro se litigants are prisoners challenging
the fact, duration, or conditions of their confinement,11 9 it is not surpris-
ing that most of the cases mandating judicial notification of summary
judgment obligations involved prisoners.1 20 It is apparent, however, that
few courts distinguish between the ordinary civil pro se litigant and his
prisoner counterpart. 121 Courts either do not perceive any material dif-
ference between the two types of litigants, or fail to attach any signifi-
cance to the ambiguity of their imprecise labels. 122
114. See, e.g., United States ex reL Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 926 (2d Cir. 1974) (pro se prisoner's habeas corpus petition raised
the issue of whether a parole board must include a statement of its reasons when it denies
a prisoner parole).
115. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 11; Turner, supra note 74, at 639-40.
116. See Turner, supra note 74, at 624-25; Comment, supra note 37, at 155.
117. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985) (reluctantly ap-
pointing counsel).
118. See M. Frankel, supra note 83, at 23-26 (attorneys' pursuit of victory for client
precludes any expectation of a duty to ensure a fair result on their part).
119. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 159-60.
120. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1986); Garaux v.
Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 437 (9th Cir. 1984); Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 517 (1 1th Cir.
1983); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 1981); Roseboro v. Garrison,
528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
121. Most of the courts addressing a prisoner pro se litigant's right to procedural
assistance indiscriminately referred in turn to "pro se litigants" and "prisoner pro se
litigants." See infra notes 122 & 125 and accompanying text.
122. The incongruity of the caselaw in this area is no more evident than in the Seventh
Circuit. The Seventh Circuit's caselaw expounding the pro se litigant's right to receive
notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule arose in the prisoner context.
Nevertheless, the caselaw developing this right evinces an unawareness of possible dis-
tinctions between prisoner and nonprisoner pro se litigants. In Madyun v. Thompson,
657 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981), the court noted "its desire to see that pro se plaintiffs have a
meaningful opportunity to defend against summary judgment motions." Id. at 876. Two
paragraphs later, the court held that procedural leniency is appropriate "where unrepre-
sented and uninformed prisoners are involved." Id. at 877. In Lewis v. Faulkner, 689
F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982), the court increases the confusion by ruling consistently in pris-
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One court, however, holds that nonprisoner pro se litigants are not
entitled to notice of summary judgment obligations as prisoners are be-
cause nonprisoners voluntarily appear pro se. 123 Another court limits
judicial notification of summary judgment obligations to prisoners and
recently released prisoners,124 basing their holding on the handicaps of
detention.12 These distinctions violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and ignore the reality that the handicaps of pro se
representation are shared by prisoners and nonprisoners alike.
A. The Equal Protection Clause Requires Courts to Advise All Pro Se
Litigants of Summary Judgment Obligations
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not ex-
plicitly apply to actions of the federal government.126 Federal classifica-
oner-oriented language while reasoning in terms of laymen. The Lewis court explicitly
limited its holding to prisoner pro se civil rights litigation and stated that they left "for
another day the possible extension of our new rule to other classes of pro se civil rights
litigants .... See id. at 102. Yet the court supports its ruling not on the handicaps
detention imposes on a litigant, but on the inability of the "layman" to understand federal
motion practice. See id; see also Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1985)
(reversible error to enter summary judgment against prisoner pro se until litigant is noti-
fied of obligations under Rule 56). In Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919 (7th Cir.
1985), without expressly extending the Lewis ruling to nonprisoner pro se litigants, the
Seventh Circuit characterized its procedural benevolence as extended to "persons without
legal knowledge or representation." See id at 920. In reference to Lewis, the court char-
acterizes that decision as applicable to "pro se litigants." See id. The court's disregard of
the Lewis limitation on the class of pro se litigants to benefit from the notification require-
ment, see Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982), suggests that the Seventh
Circuit now mandates district court advisement of summary judgment obligations to all
pro se litigants.
123. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. See Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 629-31 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
125. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases requiring procedural leniency
toward pro se litigants in the summary judgment area emphasize the burdens of restricted
movement as necessitating judicial assistance. In the 1960's and 1970's the court repeat-
edly stressed the handicaps that incarceration imposes on a pro se litigant. See, eg.,
Curry v. Brown, 440 F.2d 259, 262 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d
1091, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Phillips v. United States Bd. of Parole, 352 F.2d 711,713
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam). In the 1980's, however, the court appears to have ex-
tended its procedural protection to all pro se litigants. See Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628,
629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("This court has recognized that district judges
should accord special attention to pro se litigants faced with summary judgment mo-
tions."). The court maintains that the handicaps of detention necessitate judicial advise-
ment of the summary judgment rule to prisoner pro se litigants. See id. at 630. The court
asserts, however, that judges also must assist pro se litigants recently released from prison
because they are likely to shoulder similar disadvantages as prisoners. See id. The handi-
cap linking the prisoner pro se litigant to his nonprisoner counterpart would seem to be
indigency. Although statistics are not available demonstrating why pro se litigants ap-
pear as such, it has been suggested that an inability to obtain counsel spawns most pris-
oner, see Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983), and nonprisoner, see Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1367-
68 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) pro se appearances.
126. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." See U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tions, however, that would contravene the equal protection clause if they
were state classifications, violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 127 Equal protection does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages: 2 8 it requires only that people who are simi-
larly situated be treated similarly.129 The equal protection clause applies
to administrative 3 as well as legislative classifications.' 3 1 Therefore, the
classification of nonprisoner pro se litigants as nonbeneficiaries of sum-
mary judgment notification accorded prisoner pro se litigants is subject
to equal protection analysis.
Under traditional equal protection analysis, unless the classification in-
fringes on a fundamental right 32 or involves a suspect classification, 133 it
need only be rationally related to a legitimate end.' 3 1 If the classification
does infringe a fundamental right or involve a suspect classification, it
must be necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest.'35 It is well
established that the right of access to the courts is fundamental. 1
36
Although the right is particularly crucial to prisoners,3 7 the right is fun-
127. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guar-
antee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 540 (1977) (discussing the legitimacy of apply-
ing the mandates of equal protection to the federal government).
128. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361,
367 (D. Conn. 1978); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 14.2, at
525 (3d ed. 1986).
129. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1977); Ha-
gans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1974); Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
130. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th Cir. 1973)
(administrative policy of dismissal of school teachers at sixth month of pregnancy).
131. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 434 (1982); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S.
412, 423-24 (1981); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
132. A right is fundamental when the Constitution explicitly or implicitly guarantees
the right. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
Various implicit fundamental rights have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (voting and interstate travel); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-44 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630-31 (1969) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (right to use contraceptives).
133. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (race); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (national origin).
134. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1985); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
135. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
136. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206, 1212 (1lth Cir. 1981); Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973).
137. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 485 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 502 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("lack of technical competence of prisoners
should not strangle consideration of a valid constitutional claim that is bunglingly
presented"); Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) ("especial care
... must be exercised when an action is brought alleging denial of basic constitutional
liberties by an indigent prisoner lacking formal legal training"); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697
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damental to all persons, whether incarcerated or free.138 Thus, classifica-
tions impinging on the right must be closely related to the promotion of a
compelling state interest.
1. The Interests
The judiciary has two possible interests in imposing restrictions on the
right of access: fiscal objectives and administrative objectives. 139 When
evaluating economic barriers to the right of access in civil cases, the
courts are reluctant to impose the costs of litigation on the govern-
ment.14° The government's interest in preserving judicial funds, how-
ever, is not implicated by extending certain procedural assistance to all
pro se litigants. Moreover, most pro se litigants already are accorded sig-
nificant financial assistance from the judiciary. 4' Judicial notification in-
volves no financial expenditures by the judiciary.'42 Finally, since most
courts clearly acknowledge the right of prisoner pro se litigants to sum-
mary judgment notification, 143 and ninety-five percent of pro se litigants
are prisoners,'" it is absurd to contend that advising the remaining five
percent of pro se litigants unduly drains government resources.
The administrative objectives to be furthered by limiting judicial notifi-
cation of summary judgment obligations to prisoner pro se litigants simi-
larly are incapable of rising to the level of a compelling interest.
F.2d 761, 763 (7th Cir.) ("when rights of a constitutional dimension are at stake, a poor
person's access to the federal courts must not be turned into an exercise in futility"), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d
Cir. 1957) (en bane) "([w]e must not play fast and loose with basic constitutional rights in
the interest of administrative efficiency"), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958).
138. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579; Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Johnson v.
Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (D. Del. 1974).
139. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
140. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) (indigents
have no right to waiver of $25 filing fee necessary for judicial review of administrative
denial of welfare payments); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973) (indigent has
no right to waiver of $50 filing fee in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings); Johnson v.
Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983) (indigent has no right to have state pay
witness fees). But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (indigents entitled
to waiver of filing fees in divorce actions).
141. Eighty-four percent of pro se litigants commence civil actions without prepay-
ment of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982). See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at
187 n.112. See generally Note, Aid for Indigent Litigants in the Federal Courts, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 832 (1958) (discussing the value of permitting indigents to file suits with-
out prepayment of fees); Note, Litigation Costs The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56
Geo. L.J. 516 (1968) (same).
142. See Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985). The notification
may involve cost of postage when the judge or his clerks are not in direct contact with the
pro se litigant. Postage expenditures of indigent pro se litigants, however, are already
provided for by the government. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977); King
v. Atiyeh, No. 85-4174, slip op. at 5-6 (9th Cir. April 8, 1987).
143. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); Moore v. Flor-
ida, 703 F.2d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1983); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
144. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 159-60.
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Nonprisoner pro se litigants comprise such a small part of all pro se liti-
gation that many judges believe these cases do not present a burden on
the judiciary at all. 145 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
circuit court that hears the most prisoner civil rights petitions, 46 re-
cently noted that judicial notification of summary judgment obligations
to pro se litigants "should alleviate an injustice, without adding to the
workload of the ... court[s]."' 14 7 The exclusion of five percent of pro se
litigants from the heightened procedural solicitude accorded prisoner pro
se litigants bears little relation to the judiciary's administrative objective
of lessening the workload of the courts. The rationale of courts that limit
notification of the requirements of the summary judgment rule to pris-
oner pro se litigants are invalid given the circumstances attendant most
pro se appearances.
B. The Difficulties of Pro Se Representation Are Shared by Prisoners
and Nonprisoners
1. Most Pro Se Appearances Are Not Voluntary
Aware of the disparity in legal skills between attorneys and laymen,
few individuals able to afford assistance of counsel choose to proceed pro
se. 4 It is not suprising, then, that most pro se litigants represent them-
selves because of an economic inability to procure counsel. 149 The inabil-
ity of a substantial portion of American society to gain access to attorney
145. See Committee, supra note 80, at 109.
146. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Twelve Month Period Ended June 30, 1986, at 14. The Seventh Circuit
entertained 73 prisoner civil rights appeals. The next highest was the Third Circuit with
41. See id.
147. See Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985).
148. See Jacobsen, 790 F.2d at 1367-68 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Zeigler & Hermann,
supra note 4, at 187 (almost all pro se litigants appear as such because of inability to
afford counsel).
149. See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 165. This economic disadvantage fur-
ther hampers the pro se litigant's ability to comply with the affidavit requirement under
Rule 56(e). Testimony crucial to presenting an issue of material fact often is unobtain-
able because the pro se litigant cannot afford to pay for a deposition before trial. See
Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indi-
gent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 233 (1970). Expenses of
discovery are the primary costs of litigation after attorney fees. See Zeigler & Hermann,
supra note 4, at 192. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982), the federal in forma pauperis statute,
does not provide discovery costs for pro se litigants. See Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685,
690 (5th Cir. 1967); Ebenhart v. Power, 309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also
United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (right to appear pro se does
not include right to research claims at state's expense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983).
Thus, it is not suprising that only 6.5% of pro se plaintiffs attempt to obtain discovery.
See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 204. Even when aware of the responding affida-
vit requirement, the pro se litigant could become exasperated easily at his inability to
gather facts supporting the affidavit and fail to respond. Merely informing a pro se liti-
gant of his obligations under Rule 56(e), therefore, may not safeguard his claim suffi-
ciently. See Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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assistance has been deemed one of the glaring failures of our system,'5
straining the principle of equal justice under the law.15 ' The causes of
this problem are numerous.
Indigents have no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in a civil
case,152 and no such right in habeas corpus proceedings unless absence of
counsel would render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. 53 The Fed-
eral Judicial Center has concluded that currently it is not feasible to pro-
vide counsel to indigents in civil rights cases.'
5 4
Furthermore, there is no mandate by the American Bar Association
requiring attorneys to performpro bono work. 5' The increase in billable
hours expected by law firms from their attorneys has dampened the in-
centive of many attorneys to pursuepro bono work.' 56 Thus, it is difficult
for an indigent litigant to find an attorney willing to handle civil cases.' 57
Forceful economic arguments have been directed at this contention,
asserting that a meritorious claim always will find an attorney.' 5 8 Judge
Posner asserts that rather than presume that counsel should be appointed
in civil cases, courts should "subject the probable merit of [the] case to
the test of the market."' 59 This argument contends that a litigant who is
unable to retain counsel on a contingent fee does not have a meritorious
case. 160
This argument is problematic, as pro se litigants face serious difficul-
ties in retaining counsel, even on a contingent fee basis.' 6 The vast ma-
150. See M. Frankel, supra note 83, at 119-20.
151. See id at 120.
152. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618 (1974); Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d
1433, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986); Wiggins v. Sargent,
753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th
Cir.1981); Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
153. See Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961).
154. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 69.
155. See Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1214 (1983).
156. See Adams, Pro Bono Work-'A Question of Time, Money, Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986
at 6, col. 1.
157. See iL
158. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); see also Duniway, The Poor
Man in the Federal Courts, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1270, 1285 (1966).
159. See Merritt, 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
160. See id. at 770; accord Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979); Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex.
1986).
161. In Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (1lth Cir. 1986), the court vacated an
injunction requiring that a pro se litigant bring a lawsuit only if assisted by counsel. See
id at 1071. The court found that this litigant could not retain counsel because of his
reputation for meritless suits and attorneys' fear of appearing in his complaints. See id.
Such attorney fear of sanction is perhaps unnecessary in § 1983 actions. See Hall v.
Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980) (court-appointed attorneys do not act under
color of state law for § 1983 purposes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982); Minns v. Paul,
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jority of cases brought under section 1983 are dismissed prior to trial.162
Thus, only a somewhat adventurous attorney would be willing to accept
a prisoner's civil rights case on a contingent fee basis. 163 Moreover, even
if an attorney believes he could obtain a contingent fee, it is unlikely that
the award of damages will be sufficiently high to attract him.164 Because
there is no minimum amount in controversy in section 1983 cases, 165 an
attractive award hardly is guaranteed in successful civil rights cases. In-
deed, a recent two-year survey revealed that only a small percentage of
civil rights plaintiffs over the last two years obtained damages or
settlements. 166
Pro se litigants unable to secure an attorney on a contingent fee basis
542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1976) (court-appointed attorneys acting within the scope of
their duties possess absolute immunity from damage actions brought pursuant to § 1983),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977).
162. In 1979, 96.5% of prisoner § 1983 cases were dismissed prior to trial. See 1980
Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 9-10. See generally D. Manville, Prisoners' Self-Help
Litigation Manual 8 (2d ed. 1986) (warning prisoners of difficulty they are likely to have
in obtaining counsel because of low rate of successful prisoner litigation).
163. An attorney seeking a contingent fee in a civil rights case would have to trust that
he has found one of the claims in the 3.5% that either get to trial or are settled. See supra
note 162 and accompanying text. The scarcity of successful civil rights suits is largely a
result of the stringent standards courts have established to which such claims are held.
For example, courts consistently have afforded wide latitude to prison officials in matters
of prison administration. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Wiggins v. Sargent,
753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985). But see Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 959 (7th
Cir.) (courts will vigorously police prisoners' constitutional rights), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
996 (1983). For a good summary of the arguments advanced on behalf of judicial defer-
ence to prison administrative discretion, see Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 224-25
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 673 (1987). Further, the Supreme Court has
narrowed significantly the availability of constitutionally-based claims. See Whitely v.
Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085 (1986) (no eighth amendment violation absent deliberate
indifference to prisoner); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 669 (1986) (negligent depri-
vation of property does not constitute a constitutional violation); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (prisoners have no expectation of privacy); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (prison officials liable to prisoners under § 1983 only if their
conduct violates clearly established rights); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980)
(collateral estoppel applicable to § 1983 suit subsequent to unsuccessful habeas corpus
claim); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (prison officials' good faith belief
in legality of their actions precludes § 1983 liability); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-
06 (1976) (medical malpractice not actionable under § 1983).
164. See M. Frankel, supra note 83, at 115; see also Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761,
769 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983) (noting lack of
economic incentives for lawyers to represent prisoners).
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3), (4) (1982); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179-
80 (1961); Stone v. City of Wichita Falls, 646 F.2d 1085, 1086 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Author. of Ga., 621 F.2d 1301,
1308 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980). This provision has been questioned
because it provides a federal forum for de minimis deprivations. See Russell v. Bodner,
489 F.2d 280, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1973) (Adams, J., concurring) (confiscation of seven packs
of cigarettes).
166. See Agins, Jailhouse Lawyers, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 3. The survey
revealed that inmates were awarded damages in only 87 cases and attained settlements in
161. See id. In that same period, over 37,500 petitions for damages were filed. See id.
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probably are unable to afford attorney fees.' 67 In civil cases, high discov-
ery costs and legal fees render legal assistance beyond the financial reach
of ninety percent of the nation.' 68 Attorneys also are reluctant to repre-
sent poor clients because there is currently no way of guaranteeing com-
pensation of a lawyer representing an indigent litigant.1
69
Courts have found it extremely difficult to attract counsel to serve
without compensation. Aside from the obvious monetary reasons, attor-
neys believe they have nothing to gain and much to lose through possible
malpractice actions.' 7 Many court-appointed attorneys also believe that
their close ties to the state preclude their rendering effective legal services
to indigents suing the state or a state agent.' Further, there is some
question whether an attorney is likely to render his best efforts for a non-
paying client.1
72
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act 7 1 permits appointed
attorneys to apply for attorney's fees if they substantially prevail on the
merits in section 1983 actions.' 74 Judge Posner contends that this provi-
sion supplies adequate incentive to attorneys to seek out meritorious civil
rights cases. 175 The soundness of this contention has been challenged on
the ground that attorneys know that few civil rights plaintiffs prevail on
the merits.' 76 Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center reports that the Act
has not had any discernible impact in persuading attorneys to consider
civil rights cases.
17 7
2. The Handicaps of Detention Are Not a Proper Basis for Limiting
Notification to Prisoners
Although incarceration hampers prisoner pro se litigants' ability to
pursue claims, emphasizing the handicaps of incarceration in limiting
167. For example, during 1980-81, about three-quarters of Florida's inmates earn
fewer than six hundred dollars a month. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F.Supp. 1330,
1338 (M.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 107 S. CL 313 (1986). For further discussions of the financial resources of prison-
ers, see ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal
Services to Prisoners, reprinted in 8 Ga. L. Rev. 363, 368 (1974); Delaware Prisoners Find-
ing Careers at Fifty Cents a Day, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1987, at 50, col. 1. Nonprisoner
pro se litigants are hampered by similar economic disadvantages. See Zeigler & Her-
mann, supra note 4, at 187.
168. See A. Strick, Injustice for All 103 (1977); see also Flannery & Robbins, supra
note 38, at 773.
169. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 65; D. Manville, supra note 162, at 8.
170. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 13.
171. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986).
172. See Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 514, 526.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
174. See id.
175. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 770 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
176. See Turk, supra note 38, at 1355; see also supra notes 161-63 and accompanying
text.
177. See 1980 Aldisert Report, supra note 12, at 12.
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procedural benefits to prisoners is unjustified. Prisoners in fact enjoy sev-
eral benefits over nonprisoners in their pro se appearances. The decided
advantage prisoner pro se litigants enjoy over nonprisoner pro se litigants
in ready access to a law library has troubled members of the legal com-
munity.178 As a practical matter, prisoners also have far more time to
devote to pursuing their claims than nonprisoners. 7 9 Permission to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis is extended more readily to prisoners18 0 and pris-
oners are given free drafting materials such as pens and paper.'8"
Several courts have reasoned that pro se litigants are entitled to notifi-
cation of summary judgment obligations because of their inability to dis-
cern those obligations unassisted. 8 2 This analysis properly emphasizes
the handicap common to all pro se litigants. The deficiency in most pris-
oner pro se litigants' educations is well-documented.183 To suggest, how-
ever, that the relatively higher level of education of nonprisoner pro se
litigants elevates them to a full appreciation of procedural rules is errone-
ous. Studies indicate that college level reading ability is necessary to con-
duct effective legal research.184 Thus, it is doubtful whether laymen,
prisoners and nonprisoners alike are able to perceive their responsive ob-
ligations when served with a "Motion To Dismiss, Or, In The Alterna-
178. See Flaherty, Law, Books, and Prisoners, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 1, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
The primary concern of Bounds was providing access to the courts for prisoners with
valid constitutional claims. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-28 (1977). Prisoners,
however, often use the law library for legal matters unrelated to the fact or circumstances
of their confinement. See Flaherty, supra note 178, at 6, col. 1.
179. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (1 lth Cir. 1986); Resource Center,
supra note 167, at 368; Potuto, supra note 6 at 236.
180. See, e.g., Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071; In re Smith, 600 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1979);
Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823-24 (3d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Irons v.
Pennsylvania, 407 F. Supp. 746, 746-47 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Turner, supra note 74 at 617.
But see Shimabuku v. Britton, 357 F. Supp. 825, 826 (D. Kan. 1973) (leave to proceed in
forma pauperis denied to prisoner with $45 in account), aff'd, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir.
1974); Carroll v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (leave denied to
prisoner with $204 in account).
181. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986).
182. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985); Griffith v. Wainwright,
772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985); Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 898 (7th Cir.)
(Swygert, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d
100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979); Zeigler
& Hermann, supra note 9, at 181, 202. See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487
(1969) (illiteracy of most prisoners precludes them from effectively handling their own
causes); Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.N.J. 1982) (providing inmates
with a law library amounts to a "useless and meaningless gesture ... mak[ing] about as
much sense as furnishing medical services through books like: 'Brain Surgery Self-
Taught' "); Resource Center, supra note 167, at 368 (questioning ability of prisoners to
use law library).
183. See, e.g., Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ- Writing, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 343, 352
(1968); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 181-82; Note, A Prisoner's Constitutional
Right to Attorney Assistance, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1279, 1281 (1983).
184. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 313 (1986).
[Vol. 551136
EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
five, For Summary Judgment."' 185
CONCLUSION
Failure to inform pro se litigants of a potentially fatal procedural re-
quirement such as the reply affidavit requirement of the summary judg-
ment rule dissipates the right of access and works to discourage a full
hearing on the merits. Judicial notification of the requirements of the
summary judgment rule provides an unburdensome method of ensuring a
pro se litigant an adequate hearing on the merits and does not compro-
mise the judge's role in the adversary system. Because pro se litigants
cannot discern their summary judgment obligations adequately from
Rule 56, the pro se litigant's right of access to the courts can be safe-
guarded only by imposition of a notification rule as a constitutional
minimum.
Joseph M, McLaughlin
185. See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Jacobsen v.
Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (laymen lack skills
of statutory construction); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 4, at 202-03 (same).
1987] 1137

